En
  • دکتری (1389)

    منطق فلسفی

    دانشگاه تربیت مدرس، ایران

  • کارشناسی‌ارشد (1385)

    فلسفه و کلام اسلامی

    دانشگاه اصفهان، ایران

  • کارشناسی (1382)

    مهندسی برق

    دانشگاه صنعتی اصفهان، ایران

  • منطق
  • متا-متافیزیک
  • متافیزیک
  • فلسفۀ اسلامی

    من یک فیلسوف هستم.

    ارتباط

    رزومه

    Existence as a first-order predicate: Themes from Mirdamad

    D Hosseini
    Journal Papers , , {Pages }

    Abstract

    Mīr Dāmād on essence, existence and priority

    D Hosseini
    Journal Papers , , {Pages }

    Abstract

    Quantifier Variance Without Meaning Variance

    Davood Hosseini
    Journal PapersAxiomathes , Volume 30 , Issue 3, 2020 June , {Pages 313-325 }

    Abstract

    Quantifier variance entails that ‘there exists’ has a variety of meanings. Determining what makes all these meanings quantifier meanings is a problem associated with this view (the problem of meaning variance). A reasonable candidate suggested by Hirsch is the set of formal rules governing quantification. However, the collapse argument presents a notorious objection to the viability of the candidate: there cannot be more than one quantifier obeying the same rules up to logical equivalence. It is proposed that a quantifier variantist who intends to retain Hirsch’s proposed solution can admit a many-sorted language in order to block the collapse argument. Within the many-sorted language, a Kaplanian thesis about the rules governing sor

    Logical Pluralism: Where the Conflict Really Lies

    M Haeri, D Hosseini
    Journal Papers , , {Pages }

    Abstract

    Vagueness in the World: A Supervaluationist Approach

    Ali Abasnezhad, Davood Hosseini
    Journal Papers , 2014 January , {Pages 239-255 }

    Abstract

    A na?ve perspective on the world suggests that the world we live in is full of vague objects. In this chapter, a version of the supervaluationist framework will be proposed to provide a systematic conception of such a na?ve perspective. Precisifications of a vague object will be characterized as objects that, were they actual objects, every determinate truth about the vague object would be true about them. It will be argued that this view is more effective than other versions of supervaluationism at accommodating commonsensical and metaphysical considerations. The view leaves room for vague identity as a kind of “no fact of the matter.” Thus, Evans’ argument against ontic vagueness fails in a natural way.

    دروس نیمسال جاری

    • كارشناسي ارشد
      منطق رياضي ( واحد)
      دانشکده علوم انسانی، گروه فلسفه و حكمت و منطق
    • كارشناسي ارشد
      متافيزيك ( واحد)
    • كارشناسي ارشد
      متافيزيك تحليلي ( واحد)

    دروس نیمسال قبل

    • كارشناسي ارشد
      منطق رياضي ( واحد)
      دانشکده علوم انسانی، گروه فلسفه و حكمت و منطق
    • دكتري
      فلسفه تحليلي ( واحد)
    • دكتري
      فلسفه تطبيقي ( واحد)
    • كارشناسي ارشد
      نظريه مقدماتي مجموعه ( واحد)
    • كارشناسي ارشد
      تاريخ فلسفه تحليلي ( واحد)
    • 1396
      شريعتي دهاقان, محمدباقر
      ضرورت گرايي ويليامسون
    • 1398
      امين زاده, تيرداد
    • 1392
      رنجبر, هما
      سير تطور معناي اصالت وجود از صدرا تا دوران معاصر
    • 1393
      معلم, حاتم
    • 1396
      زندي گوهرريزي, ميثم
    • 1397
      نجفي, حسين
    • عضو هیئت مدیرۀ انجمن منطق ایران 1392-1397
      داده ای یافت نشد

    مهم

    جدید

      اطلاعیه ای درج نشده است